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Francisco Apellániz
Venetian Trading Networks in the Medieval
Mediterranean To understand the system of business rela-
tions within the commercial network of the Republic of Venice,
this article adopts a network analysis that differs from a standard
narrative based on a privileged subset of actors or relations. It al-
lows us to examine the socially mixed group of entrepreneurs,
brokers, and shippers at the heart of Venice’s economic system, as
well as the various conditions under which they operated. Ven-
ice’s overseas mercantile relations, shaped by the ruling patriciate,
were riddled with restrictions upon foreigners and colonial sub-
jects. The Venetian trading community centered in Alexandria
from 1418 to 1420 exempliªed this far-reaching Venetian system
during the fourteenth and ªfteenth centuries. It featured a number
of lower-rank characters negotiating, ºaunting, and frequently
breaking the rules, all to the greater proªt of the empire.
the venetian patricians and their commercial allies The
nature of the sources has usually led historians to focus on pre-
dominant ªgures, whose family names can be easily noticed in the
documents as charge holders and whose family lines and more or-
thodox careers can be easily reconstructed in the long run. Ven-
ice’s overseas trade was undoubtedly in the hands of its patricians
(a similar domination may well have applied to other strategic sec-
tors, such as the banking system or the salt monopoly). Scholars
stress the importance of Venice’s noble families in the major trad-
ing cities of the Middle East; patricians held a large share of Ven-
ice’s total investment in spices and oriental goods. Annales-style
research on the major trade in spices usually underlines the pre-
dominance of noblemen, particularly those belonging to the old
nobility (case vecchie), in the main commercial institutions, such
as the consulates and their ruling councils. Indeed, recent works
on ªfteenth-century Aleppo and Alexandria show that patri-
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cians held the biggest share in the total investment. The nobles’
grip on investment and on the overseas trading guilds remains
unimpeachable.1
Yet, this information does not tell us much about the actual
composition and the functioning of Venetian networks. Apart
from their economic domination, could Venetian noblemen alone
have implemented an efªcient system of mutual support and busi-
ness collaboration? This study of a particular network—that of the
merchants in Alexandria from 1418 to 1420—attempts to assess the
role of such lower-rank participants as Jews, Greeks, colonial sub-
jects, and foreigners within the exclusive commercial networks of
the Serenissima.2
Given the growing historical interest in trading diasporas and
cross-cultural forms of economic organization, the network ap-
proach adopted herein privileges the importance of social linkages
instead of social status, focusing on patterns of human interaction.
Scholars working in other areas of the Mediterranean have paid at-
tention to the interactions of colonial subjects and other local mer-
chants along the main long-distance networks of Genoa and Ven-
ice. But the view of merchant networks in the Mediterranean as
mixed and collaborative remains marginal in the literature. Al-
though the Venetian nobility became dominant in the Alexandrian
business community during the late 1410s, members of the patrici-
ate had a limited presence in Egypt until the beginning of the ªf-
teenth century, after which they necessarily had to cooperate with
with many individuals of lower status. In the medieval Mediterra-
nean, uprooted individuals seldom left meaningful traces of their
alliances and strategies. To cope with this problem, the network
approach adopted in this article aims at placing everyone—rich and
poor, noble and common, et al.—on the same level.3
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1 For the dominance of nobles in the maritime trade of Venice, see Bernard Doumerc and
Doris Stockly, “L’évolution du capitalisme marchand à Venise: Le ªnancement des galere da
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galées du marché à Venise (ªn XIIIe–milieu XVesiècle) (Leiden, 1995); Claire Judde De Larivière,
Naviguer, Commercer, Gouverner: Économie Maritime et Pouvoirs à Venise (XVe–XVIe Siècles)
(Leiden, 2008).
2 For more speciªc studies about the Venetians in Aleppo and Alexandria, see Eric Vallet,
Marchands vénitiens en Syrie à la ªn du XVe siècle: pour l’honneur et le proªt (Paris, 1999); Georg
Christ, Trading Conºicts: Venetian Merchants and Mamluk Ofªcials in Late Medieval Alexandria
(Boston, 2012). These two studies focus primarily on Venetian noblemen, describing overseas
networks as deªned by metropolitan social values and political institutions.
3 For other areas of the Mediterranean, see Nevra Necipoglu, “Byzantines and Italians in
Fifteenth-Century Constantinople: Commercial Cooperation and Conºict,” New Perspectives
The large majority of the merchants operating in Alexandria,
Egypt, between 1418 and 1420 came from either the Venetian me-
tropolis or from its colonies. Since in those years, other communi-
ties were temporarily banned or discouraged for political reasons
from trading with Egypt, the resulting picture allows us to glimpse
the interaction between all members of the Venetian trade dias-
pora, within which an important distinction should be drawn.
Apart from Venetian noblemen and citizens, this diaspora also in-
cluded a number of Greeks, Jews, naturalized foreigners, Christian
and Jewish renegades, migrants, and exiles, all of whom are deªned
herein as lower-rank Venetians.
The complete series of seventy-eight notary records from the
casebook of Vittore Bonfantin that this article scrutinizes to de-
scribe and analyze the 1418 to 1420 network mention 185 different
people, who appear 414 times in the documents. Although more
than 80 percent of them were Venetians, either from the metropo-
lis or from its colonies, they had twenty different places of origin.4
The disadvantage of depicting the interconnections within
such a group of people through a set of contracts and notarial deeds
becomes immediately evident: Unlike merchant correspondence
and private letters, notary records provide no psychological insight
about individual choices, background experiences, or motivations.
The advantage, however, is that these notarial acts allow us to treat
all of the participants’ relationships—regardless of differences in
ethnicity, status, and wealth—equally. To counter the criticism
that a network analysis of this kind fails to account for the forma-
tion and evolution of social linkages, we complement our network
analysis with a cultural, microhistorical examination of the origins,
as well as the cultural and political circumstances, of the Mediterra-
nean trade that took place between 1418 and 1420.5
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on Turkey, XII (1995), 129–143; Serghej P. Karpov, “Grecs et Latins à Trébizonde (XIIIe–
XVe siècle): Collaboration économique, rapports politiques,” in Michel Balard (ed.), Etat et
colonisation au Moyen Age et à la Renaissance (Lyon, 1989), 413–424; Angeliki E. Laiou-
Thomadakis, “The Byzantine Economy in the Mediterranean Trade System; Thirteenth-
Fifteenth Centuries,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers, XXXIV (1980), 177–222; Maria Fusaro, “Les
Anglais et les Grecs: Un reseau de cooperation commerciale en Mediterranee venitienne,”
Annales, LVIII (2003), 605–626. This article owes much to the combined use of historical
databases. The Cives database permitted new citizens to be traced in the network (http://
www.civesveneciarum.net/), and the Online Catasto of 1427 provided material about the
Florentine citizen in the network (http://www.stg.brown.edu/projects/catasto/).
4 Names and abstracts of Bonfantin’s deeds can be consulted in an online application (upon
registration) at http://notaires-venitiens.com/notaries/users/login.
5 For the century and a half from the establishment of the Alexandrian galleys in 1344 to the
the 1418 to 1420 network The analysis herein focuses on links
between individuals, and their structural position along the net-
work, as they appear in Bonfantin’s records. When a client used
the notary’s services, for instance, to appoint somebody as his
agent through a power of attorney or a commission agency, the
client has a link with the agent, as well as with the witnesses to the
deed. If the power of attorney implies, for instance, the rescue of
debts from a third party, the client is also socially linked to the
debtor. In order to stress agency rather than mere involvement in
business deals, no other links are taken into consideration (for ex-
ample, between agents and/or the witnesses themselves, who may
not have known each other). Hence, key actors in the network
are those who were most required by others as partners or wit-
nesses, and/or were most active themselves. The overwhelming
majority of social relations can be traced from either commission
contracts or powers of attorney (ªfty-three out of seventy-eight
documents), both of which merchants used to delegate power to a
partner in order to make business decisions. As a means to bestow
ample autonomy on a commissioner’s actions, a general commis-
sion or a power of attorney was generally underwritten with a rep-
utable partner.
The analysis herein is based on two simple concepts in net-
work theory—degree centrality and betweenness centrality. De-
gree centrality derives from the number of ties that bind a particular
person to others in a network; betweenness reºects the capacity of
a person to connect people or groups of people who would other-
wise be isolated from each other in a network. Degree is often in-
terpreted in terms of a person’s exposure to whatever is ºowing
through the network. It thus applies as much to the probability of
ªnding good business opportunities as it would to that of catching a
virus (in fact, three of the people in the degree ranking died during
the plague epidemics in Egypt). Betweenness measures brokerage
160 | FRANCISCO APELLÁNIZ
Ottoman conquest of Egypt (1517), Venetian notaries comprised the only active Latin notarial
institution in Alexandria, providing services to all of the foreign merchants. Indeed, no similar
material has been found outside Venice. Bonfantin, the only active notary in the city from
1418 to 1420, worked for Biagio Dolªn when he was consul in Egypt. See B. 22, Notary
V. Bonfantin, Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Cancelleria Inferiore, Notai (hereinafter asve,
ci, n). For the everyday life of the Venetian community in Alexandria, see Christ, Trading
Conºicts. For the interruption of Catalan and Genoese activities, see Eliyahu Ashtor, Levant
Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Princeton, 1983), 22–26.
capacity, indicating individuals that are in a good position to medi-
ate between others.6
The serial and complete documentary sample, the relational
nature of the records, the criteria employed to deªne relationships,
and the concepts underpinning the network analysis herein all con-
tribute to understanding the weight of both noblemen and com-
moners in the network, but particularly the latter’s relevance in the
system of relations. Table 1 shows the core of the network, listing
the eighteen most central people by degree and betweenness, from
a total sample of 185 people.
A glance at the 1418 to 1420 network clearly shows its hetero-
geneous character. In addition to Venetian noblemen, the top posi-
tions are occupied by Greek merchants from Crete, together with
several naturalized foreigners; Venetian subjects working for the
sultanate’s authorities as tax farmers; informers in Cairo; and even
one Jewish merchant. Among the patricians, the most relevant
commercial lineages are represented by the Michiel, Dolªn, Zorzi,
Bernardo, Querini, Capello, Bembo, Corner, and Contarini fami-
lies. The degree and betweenness ratings are similar in this net-
work. However, as well-positioned in degree centrality (that is,
well connected with the rest of the merchant community through
numerous ties) as lower-ranked Venetians were, they were even
more important as brokers. A glance at the degree-centrality ªg-
ures shows that patricians shared the highest positions in the net-
work with second-rank Venetians, but a betweenness viewpoint
makes clear that they followed their lower-ranked colleagues as
brokers.
By grouping people according to social status, religion, or
trading nation, the literature on Mediterranean merchants tends to
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For the divide between qualitative and quantitative—or social-scientiªc and narrative—
forms of history, as it relates to the criticism of network analysis, see Charles Tilly, “Observa-
tions of Social Processes and Their Formal Representations,” Sociological Theory, XXII (2004),
595–602. For a seminal discussion of the interrelationship between social-structural and cul-
tural analysis, see Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, “Network Analysis, Culture, and the
Problem of Agency,” American Journal of Sociology, XCIX (1994), 1411–1454; Bonnie H.
Erickson, “Social Networks and History: A Review Essay,” Historical Methods, XXX (1997),
149–157.
6 Bartolomeo De Soris had died of plague by June 25, 1420, Filippo Malerbi by May 28,
1420, and Dolªn by the end of April the same year. Many Venetian merchants in Alexandria
were ill during March and April 1420 when the plague hit Alexandria. See B. 22, Notary
V. Bonfantius: June 25, 1420, May 28, 1420, asve, ci, n; Christ, Trading Conºicts, 279.
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stress differences rather than commonalities. Network analysis,
with its focus on relations, ºattens these categorical divisions, al-
lowing us to group people via a relational criterion—engagement
in the Venetian merchant network. Thus, network analysis reveals
for the ªrst time that a nurtured group of merchants who may not
have been Venetian-born or politically important were nonetheless
crucial in the web of business relations. Ten lower-rank Venetians
and even two Jews—the category of Venetian subjects who suf-
fered the most discrimination—are at the top of the 1418 to 1420
list. The people in this reduced sample deserve attention because,
ªrst, they represent the most active part of the network and, sec-
ond, unlike their lower-rated peers, they are traceable in a wider
range of sources.
The fact that normally voiceless people, such as the ten lower-
rank Venetians mentioned in Table 1, can be traced in historical
sources is remarkable. A plausible explanation is that since they
were more active than the 165 individuals that follow them on the
rating scale, they had to face more constraints; their careers were
punctuated with such issues as exile, political persecution, or com-
mercial conºict. Furthermore, their very conspicuousness in the
sources that complement the notary records also suggests that the
analysis of centrality is fundamentally correct when it points to
them, rather than the 165 who lag behind them in the network and
virtually disappear elsewhere, as worthy of distinction.
people of high and low rank in the venetian networks The
modern idea, inspired by the values of the French Revolution,
that every individual is entitled to the citizenship of the state to
which he belongs by birthright is fundamentally wrong for the
medieval city-state of Venice with regard to its colonial dominion.
Venetian citizenship remained conªned to the metropolitan city
itself, never extended to its subjected territories, as in a modern
territorial state. Moreover, Venetian economic policy was perme-
ated by the fundamental principle of social privilege by hereditary
right, which made a rigid distinction between the natives of the
metropolitan city and those of the colonial dominion (known
as the Maritime State). The logics of free trade do not apply to
Venice—a maritime republic ruled by nobles, committed to safe-
guarding its foreign markets and shipping monopolies from the
economic competition of foreigners (forenses). As a general rule,
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Venetian citizens could not enter into partnerships with non-
Venetians to trade with Venice. Lower-rank Venetians somehow
had to navigate these citizenship and trade regulations to do busi-
ness; the galley system, the keystone of the Venetian Mediterra-
nean enterprise, was an obvious starting point.7
The Galley Service and Venetian Citizenship The galley service
was a regular system of government-run convoys, taken on lease in
public auctions by noble-owned companies. Circa 1320, the Vene-
tian government established a model for the ªnancing of the galleys
that strongly privileged patricians. According to the regulation is-
sued in 1305, only citizens with full rights (de extra) could deal in
long-distance trade. Foreigners were required a minimum resi-
dence of twenty-ªve years to acquire full citizenship and to engage
in wholesale commerce.8
The heyday of the galley system and the process of constitu-
tional reform that shaped the legal deªnition of nobility took place
at the same time (1297–1323). The legal reform deªned the Vene-
tian ruling class on the basis of kinship and hereditary rights and, ac-
cording to Jacoby, resulted in a threefold division of free people in
the Venetian empire—citizens, subjects, and protected people.
The elite segment amounted to no more than 5 percent of the met-
ropolitan population. In the period under study, these noblemen
enjoyed citizenship with the full complement of rights, including
access to high ofªce. Just beneath this status was “original” citizen-
ship, held by native-born Venetians. According to a more ªne-
grained and practical categorization, de extra citizenship implied
the right to engage in maritime, wholesale commerce, whereas de
intus citizenship, often conferred on naturalized Venetians, granted
limited access to retail, local trade.9
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7 Reinhold C. Mueller, Immigrazione e cittadinanza nella Venezia medievale (Rome, 2010),
56–57.
8 Doumerc and Stockly, L’évolution, 137; Mueller, “Greeks in Venice and ‘Venetians’ in
Greece,” in Chryssa Maltezou (ed.), Ricchi e poveri nella società dell’Oriente Grecolatino (Venice,
1998), 168–180.
9 David Jacoby, “Citoyens, sujets et protégés de Venise et de Gênes en Chypre du XIIIe au
XVe siècle,” in Recherches sur la Méditerranée orientale du XIIe au XVe siécle: peuples, sociétés,
économies (London, 1979), 159–188. The 5 % ªgure is provided by E. Natalie Rothman, “Be-
tween Venice and Istanbul: Trans-Imperial Subjects and Cultural Mediation in the Early
Modern Mediterranean,” unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Univ. of Michigan, 2006), 20–21. Gerhard
Rosch, “The Serrata of the Great Council and Venetian Society, 1286–1323,” in John Martin
and Dennis Romano (eds.), Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-
State, 1297–1797 (Baltimore, 2000), 67–89; Mueller “‘Veneti facti privilegio”: stranieri nat-
Since historiography has focused mainly on the socially privi-
leged, we lack a clear understanding of Jacoby’s two other main
status categories, subjects and protected people. If a normative
framework ever existed in Venetian chanceries and courts to deal
with colonial subjects, it was much a matter of ad hoc adjustment
and negotiation. Instead of attempting to clarify the murky legal
deªnitions applying to most of the natives of the maritime domin-
ion (ªdelis, burgensis, subditus, and various ethnic categories), this
analysis reveals how merchants negotiated their status with the au-
thorities, particularly when access to trading and citizenship rights
was at stake.
In Venice, deciding who qualiªed for full citizenship was a
subject of legal debate until the sixteenth century. When the city
became the center of a maritime and commercial empire in the
early thirteenth century, it attracted many immigrants and incorpo-
rated many native minorities. This motley population rendered the
issue of citizenship much more complex; populations incorporated
from the Byzantine world and refugees from the extinct Crusader
kingdoms required new status categories to be created.
Citizenship policies, particularly in the colonies, revolved
around, ªrst and foremost, commercial rights. The general legal
framework excluded Greek, Jewish, and other subjects of the colo-
nies from administrative posts, including the councils and other
bodies of the overseas nations. It also sought to limit their involve-
ment in trade, particularly the lucrative commerce of the galleys, in
which their participation was relegated to minor, peripheral activi-
ties. Greek subjects could neither trade with Venice nor use the
galleys. Colonial subjects, designated by the Venetian legal terms
burgenses or ªdeles, were not considered Venetian citizens, though
certain ad hoc policies mitigated the application of these principles
in the daily life of the colonies. The Venetian citizenship policy un-
derwent several changes during epidemics, de-population, and war
with Genoa. Under these circumstances, local citizenship was
granted to the dwellers of colonial cities, but it was de intus citizen-
ship, which in practice was useless outside since it implied the pro-
hibition to engage in overseas trade. Nuances to the general legal
framework barely had any demographic effect.10
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uralizzati a Venezia, 1300–1500,” in Paola Lanaro and Donatella Calabi (eds.), La città e i luoghi
degli stranieri: Italia XIV–XVIII secolo (Bari, 1998), 41–51.
10 For a discussion of the everyday application of trading restrictions, see Silvano Borsari,
Regulations were even more restrictive regarding Jews; as
inªdeles, they could not become citizens. The privileges granted to
a few Jews for services rendered to the state were rare exceptions.
One of the Jews in the 1418 to 1420 network applied for citizen-
ship of some kind, and another had a trading privilege granted.
However, as a general rule, Jews were denied citizenship and major
trading rights. Jews of Crete attempted to obtain phony citizenship
decrees multiple times during the 1420s.11
Foreigners who resided in the city of Venice for an extended
period were sometimes able to acquire citizenship through natural-
ization (per privilegium or per gratiam), but only a few of them were
permitted trade overseas. Indeed, most naturalization decrees in-
cluded explicit clauses limiting the right to engage in overseas
trade.
Notaries and Traders Like their counterparts in other Medi-
terranean port cities, the Alexandrian notaries favored legal prac-
tice over norms, and juridical considerations over cultural ones.
They almost systematically qualiªed patricians as nobilis, using cives
veneciarum for all other forms of citizenship. They never resorted to
such administrative categories as de intus or de extra. Hence, the
notaries tended to recognize only two legal categories, full citizen-
ship, which entailed consular protection and trading rights, or co-
lonial (or Jewish) status, which did not. Thus, as most historians
agree, Greeks and Jews were free to engage only in the subsidiary
trade between the colonies and the ports of the Middle East. The
notaries labelled second-rank Greeks only by their community of
origin (for example, de Candia; they never described any of them as
graecus); similarly, they referred to Jews as Jew de Candia, Jew de
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“Ricchi e Poveri nelle comunità ebraiche di Candia e Negroponte (sec.XIII–XIV),” in
Maltezou (ed.), Ricchi e poveri, 211–222; Benjamin Arbel, “Jews in International Trade: The
Emergence of the Levantines and Ponentines,” in Robert Davis and Benjamin Ravid (eds.),
The Jews of Early Modern Venice (Baltimore, 2001), 73–96. See also Jacoby, “Social Evolution of
Latin Greece,” in Norman P. Zacour and Harry W. Hazard (eds.), A History of Crusades: The
Impact of the Crusades on Europe (Madison, 1989), 175–221; Ashtor, “Jews in the Mediterranean
Trade,” in Jürgen Schneider (ed.), Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftswege. I. Mittelmeer und
Kontinent: Festschrift für Hermann Kellenbenz (Stuttgart, 1978), 441–454. Mueller, “Greeks in
Venice and ‘Venetians’ in Greece,” 172–173. Mueller summarized his views in idem, Immi-
grazione e cittadinanza nella Venezia medievale (Rome, 2010), 17–59.
11 Mueller, Cittadinanza, 32, Jacoby, “Venice and the Venetian Jews in the Eastern Medi-
terranean” in Gaetano Cozzi (ed.), Gli Ebrei a Venezia, secoli XIV–XVIII, Atti del Convegno
Internazionale organizzato dall’Istituto di Storia della Società e dello Stato Veneziano della Fondazione
Giorgio Cini, Venezia, 5–10 giugno 1983 (Venice, 1987), 29–59.
Rethimnon, etc. As long as Greeks and Jews remained in the periph-
ery of the Venetian commercial networks, they were tolerated, but
they were never welcome to engage in maritime trade with the
metropolis. Many of them were involved in short-range shipping
and credit activities, particularly in Negroponte, Constantinople,
and Crete.12
During this period, Venice enacted discriminatory policies
against Jews to increase ªscal pressure on them. The primary goal
in the beginning of the ªfteenth century was to prevent Jews from
access to land, to restrict their investments in real estate, and to
force them into serving as credit generators. New senate regula-
tions issued in 1402 prevented Cretan Jews from owning houses
and shops outside the ghetto and curtailed their real-estate transac-
tions. In 1423, Jews were further obliged to sell their real-estate
properties. At one time, Latin property owners in Crete could
pawn their lands as warranty for credit advanced by Jews, but by
1426, the Venetian authorities had forbidden this practice. Yet,
Jews had a favored role in the circulation of credit; they could trade
with the metropolis for money at the special duty of 2 percent.
While squeezing the Cretan Jews economically, Venice exacted a
series of public loans from them, six of which are documented be-
tween 1410 and 1425. The upshot is that Jews were forced into
money-lending activities in Crete more than in any other contem-
porary Christian state. The presence of Cretan Jews in Alexandria,
which peaked in these years, resulted from Venice’s legal strategy
of seeking their involvement in the draining and circulation of cap-
ital in the Venetian colonies.13
Responses to this situation varied. In Venice, foreigners tried
to be recognized as citizens, whether by good faith or by fraud. Mi-
nority merchants, as we shall see, tried to circumvent legislation by
obtaining special privileges from the authorities.
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Smail, “Notaries, Courts and the Legal Culture of Late Medieval Marseille,” in Kathryn L.
Reyerson and John V. Drendel (eds.), Urban and Rural Communities in Medieval France, Provence
and Languedoc, 1000–1500 (Boston, 1998), 23–51.
13 Joshua Starr, “Jewish Life in Crete Under the Rule of Venice,” in Proceedings of the Amer-
ican Academy for Jewish Research, XII (1942), 59–114; Elisabeth Santschi, “Contribution à
l’étude de la communauté juive en Crète vénitienne au XIVe siècle, d’après des sources
administratives et juridiques,” Studi Veneziani, XV (1973), 177–211; Frédéric Thiriet, La
Romanie Vénitienne au Moyen Age: le développement et l’exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien,
XIIe–XVe siècles (Paris, 1959), 300. Borsari, “Ricchi e Poveri,” 220.
During the fourteenth century, Alexandria was in a peripheral
position in the Indo-Mediterranean system of trade. Cairo was still
a major exchange center, as well as a large consumption market for
Indian goods, particularly before the Black Death. The Venetian
and Greek majority of permanent residents shared the city with
many Latins of unknown origin, perhaps the remnants of the post-
Crusade European diaspora in the Middle-East. From 1361 to
1363, noblemen appear only thirteen times in the Alexandrian
notary records within a group of 165 people appearing a total of
390 times.14
Between January 1393 and September 1394, a Venetian notary
in Alexandria registered in his deeds only eight patricians within a
group composed of one person from Alexandria, one from Caffa,
seventeen people from Crete (ªve of them Jews), ªve from points
unknown, and thirty-one Venetian commoners. Specialists in the
Levant trade place the rise of Venetian trade with Egypt after 1403.
Only after 1405 did the auctions for galleys in Alexandria reºect a
continued interest by investors.15
At the turn of the ªfteenth century, major geo-political devel-
opments contributed to the ascendence of the Venetian patriciate
in Alexandria. During the last decades of the fourteenth century,
the ºow of trade between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean
found several obstacles. The otherwise undistinguished polity of
Rasulid Yemen controlled the spice ºeets because Indian ships had
to call in its harbors. But after the emergence of Mecca as a regional
power, later allied to the Mamluk sultans of Egypt, the east–west
trade routes changed. During the ªrst two decades of the ªfteenth
century, the spice trade entered the Red Sea in an unprecedented
scale, but no longer under Yemeni control. The Mamluk govern-
ment eventually engineered a commercial shift away from Yemen
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14 B. 36, Notary G: Michiel Campione, August 11,1363; Bollani, July 7, 28,1362, August
12,1363; Contarini, June 2, 1362, May 18, 1362; Michiel, August 17, 1362; Cocho, August
17, 1362; Malipiero, March 15,1363; Bembo, October 27,1362; Loredan, October 28,1362;
Molino, October 28,1362; and Querini, February 12,1362, asve, ci, n.
15 Apart from the Michiel and Bembo families, the following cognomina for the 1399 to
1401 period made only sparse, ºeeting appearances: Gritti, Barbaro, Venier, Zane, Da Mula,
Malipiero, Trevisan, and Donato. See B. 22, Notary V, Bonfantin: Michiel, Francesco, Octo-
ber 29,1399, February 5, 1400, December 29, 1400; Bembo, Leonardo, October 29, 1399;
Gritti, Antonio, October 29, 1399; Grillo, Paolo, January 18, 1400; Barbaro, Antonio, Venier,
Marco, February 5, 1400; Da Mula, Antonio, May 10,1400, August 26,1400; Zane, Giovanni,
August 26, 1400; Malipiero, Lorenzo, October 4, 1400; Trevisan, Zaccaria, December 29,
1400; Donato, Maffeo, December 29, 1400, asve, ci, n.
and old merchant groups, such as the Karimi, in favor of Jedda
(Mecca’s harbor), and its own preferred entrepreneurs, the Kha-
wajas. When both the Genoese and the Catalans temporarily come
into conºict with the Mamluk sultanate, the Venetians, with their
Greek and Jewish subjects, gained control of the lucrative Alexan-
drian market from 1418 to 1420.16
Venice’s new legal deªnition of nobility, its subsequent eco-
nomic regulations, and its restrictive policy toward foreigners
accompanied this geo-political trend. After 1390, several patrician
families installed representatives in Alexandria with the express
purpose of furthering their commercial interests; thirty years later,
they were heavily involved in the spice trade. The uninterrupted
presence of these Venetian entrepreneurs resulted in Levantine ca-
reers of long standing, and to the accession of prominent merchants
to the consular charge. As it emerges from the notarial records, the
community that had commandeered the trade with Egypt by
the late 1410s included 185 people, who appeared 414 times. These
contracts mention individuals of unknown origin thirty-seven
times; Cretans appear 103 times (26 of them involving Jews), and
Venetians 239 times (136 of them involving nobles).17
During the ªrst decades of the ªfteenth century, the Venetian
citizenship policies had a twofold effect. In the ªrst place, many of
the Greek merchants who continued to operate in the extremities
of the Venetian networks began to establish themselves as media-
tors. Although the average number of patricians in the network
was much higher than before, the Greek presence did not dimin-
ish numerically during the ªrst third of the ªfteenth century. In
the second place, many Jewish merchants, hitherto not involved
in overseas trade, became active in Alexandria when conditions in
Crete became unbearable. Greeks, Jews, and patricians now found
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16 Apellániz, Pouvoir et ªnance en Méditerranée pré-moderne: Le deuxième Etat mamelouk et le
commerce des épices (1382–1517) (Barcelona, 2009), 47–115; John L. Meloy, Imperial Power and
Maritime Trade: Mecca and Cairo in the Later Middle Ages (Chicago, 2010), 66–75, 94–95;
Ashtor, Levant Trade, 106–199 (survey of major geo-political developments), 219–226 (the
privileged Venetian market).
17 Dolªn, appointed several times as consul in the 1410s and the 1420s, was in Egypt at the
beginning of the 1390s, as was Francesco Michiel (consul from 1420 to 1422), and Antonio da
Mula (consul from 1399 to1401). B. 22, Notary V. Bonfantin: April 28, 1393 (Dolªn), June 2,
1393 (Da Mula); B. 222, Notary A: Vactaciis, October 29, 1393, February 5, 1400, December
29, 1400 (Michiel), asve, ci. Consul Niccolo da Molin (1434/35) was already active in Egyp-
tian business in 1415. See B. 174, Notary Cristoforo Rizzo: December 22, 1415 (N. Da
Molin), asve, ci, n.
themselves as partners in a ºourishing trade that linked the Vene-
tian domains with the sultanate for many decades.
the role of lower-rank venetians The analysis of centrality
acquaints us with the most active people in the 1418 to 1420 net-
work. Without such analysis, the core group that emerges from
the notarial records would otherwise have dissolved in the almost
200 individuals actually quoted in the deeds. Half of this subset, as
we have seen, is comprised of lower-rank Venetians. Who were
they and how were they able to inªltrate a world dominated by
their social superiors?
Sketchy biographies of these merchants can be reconstructed
from a variety of sources—chancery and court records, personal
statements, and even autobiographies—and micro-analysis can be
used to discover their personal connections and the crucial skills
that they brought to the Venetian business community. The recon-
struction of their stories unveils a few surprises: First, the Venetian
citizens (Venetian but not noble) in the network came from a small
minority of naturalized foreigners. Second, these lower-rank busi-
nessmen were able to insinuate themselves into the network by
ªnding ways to circumvent the legal restrictions imposed by Ven-
ice on Greeks, foreigners, and colonial subjects. This article’s com-
bination of network analysis with biography helps to conciliate
what Tilly termed the “qualitative-quantitative divide” between
social-scientiªc and conventional forms of history. The aim of this
study is to challenge two assumptions: (1) that an exclusive focus on
the structure of networks cannot detect true social interaction, and
(2) that non-nobles remained secondary in the Venetian system of
business cooperation.18
Together with colonial subjects and ethnic minorities, natu-
ralized Venetians represented the smallest group of the doge’s sub-
jects. However, three new citizens hide among the fourteen most
active merchants in the 1418 to 1420 network. Because of the ob-
stacles that they encountered, forcing them into a constant re-
negotiation of their rights, they present striking similarities with the
other lower-rank Alexandrian traders.
Filippo Malerbi Filippo Malerbi’s career as a merchant in
Egypt was the result of a two-generation family strategy. His case
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illustrates how Venetian citizenship regulations could open a path
for social mobility, allowing skilled newcomers to enter into Ven-
ice’s overseas networks. Malerbi’s father and uncle came from Ve-
rona in the Veneto. They obtained Venetian citizenship de intus,
temporarily, in 1368, taking advantage of the new regulations of
1358, when, due to the high mortality and de-population of the
Black Death, Venice became more ºexible toward petitioners. At-
taining Venetian citizenship was a daunting matter for poor for-
eigners; those who managed it represented the “elite of immi-
grants.” Economic motivations—particularly the desire to engage
in long-distance trade—lay behind most of the petitions. The
Malerbis’1368 privilege was an exceptional one (de gratia), because
the petitioners did not comply with all of the Venetian regulations.
Since it was temporary and explicitly forbade the exportation of
merchandise to the northern European markets, Malerbi’s father
renewed his citizenship in 1385, this time gaining access to foreign
trade. Malerbi and his brother took the further step of begin-
ning trade activities in Alexandria. In the notarial records of 1418 to
1420, Malerbi’s personal network included numerous deals with
Pisans, Jews, Greeks from Candia, and Venetians.19
The De Soris Family The number of the “immigrant elite”
who obtained a de gratia privilege was extremely small. Only sev-
enty-two petitioners obtained this kind of citizenship between
1338 and 1490; at least two of them were present in the network
under study—the Malerbis and the De Soris families. Soro, the
forefather of the De Soris family, became Venetian through mar-
riage. As a youth, he moved to Venice with his family from Bolo-
gna, applying for Venetian citizenship in 1377. Five years later, a
new de extra privilege opened the doors of foreign trade for him.
Soro’s sons, Benedetto and Andrea, who were active in the net-
work, appeared in Alexandria several years later. In Egypt, Bene-
detto developed the third largest personal network, ranging from
the few Catalans present in the city at that time to Cretan Jews,
Dalmatians, Venetian noblemen, Cretan feudatories, and Greeks
from minor islands. However, when he died, a number of patri-
cians refused to act as his estate executors.20
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19 B. 22, Notary V. Bonfantin: July 20, 1419, December 1, 1419, February 27, 1420,
March 1, 12 (2), 20 1420, May 28, 1420, asve, ci, n; Riccardo Predelli, I libri commemoriali
della Repubblica di Venezia: Regesti, III, 70, reg. 414, Senato, misti, reg.40, fol. 11r, asve.
20 B. 22, Notary V. Bonfantin: October 28, 1418, February 23, 1419, March 3, 1419,
Clario Arcangeli Clario Arcangeli, like others, was an outsider
who joined the Venetian network after suffering persecution that
compelled him to change his political afªliation. Florentine sources
reveal that his father, who was banned from the city of Florence af-
ter the popular revolt of 1382, settled in Venice. Because of his fa-
ther’s past in Florence, Clario did not have safe conduct there (exile
often applied to the whole family). During the 1418 to 1420 inter-
val, he was believed to enjoy some form of Venetian citizenship.
Otherwise, he would not have been accepted as a Venetian mer-
chant and as a member of the Venetian guild in Alexandria.
His contribution to the network, like that of every other up-
rooted merchant in Table 1, is beyond question. During the mid-
1410s, he formed a company in Egypt with some Venetians, invest-
ing huge sums of money in the Cairo spice market. He may have
pooled resources from third parties to raise as much as 50,000 duc-
ats for a deal with Shaykh ‘Ali al-Kilani, one of the most important
Muslim merchants of his time. The amount of this transaction
makes Arcangeli one of the most prominent brokers in the Levant
for the whole time span under study. Although he favored contacts
with new citizens like Benedetto De Soris, his ªnancial services were
frequently in demand by Venetian patricians, for whom he brokered
deals with Catalans, Jews, andMamluk ofªcers. LikeMalerbi and De
Soris, he was a foreigner who offered his skills as a negotiator and
businessman to patrician investors in the metropolis.21
Arcangeli’s story raises the issue of how those of lower-rank
could circumvent the restrictive Venetian citizenship policies.
Felice Brancacci, a Florentine ambassador to Egypt in 1422, de-
scribed Arcangeli as an impostor, reporting that Arcangeli passed
himself off as a Venetian for a long time in Egypt because “it was
convenient to be considered as such.”22
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July 20, 1419, October 29, 1419, November 1, 16, 1419, December 2, 1419, January 1, 1420,
February 12, 27, 1420, June 25, 1420, July 8, 17, 1420; B. 174, Notary Cristoforo Rizzo: De-
cember 22, 1415, January 1, 1416 (dated 1415, according to the more veneto), asve, ci, n;
Grazie, reg. 17, fol. 90v, 115r, Senato, Privilegi, reg. 1, fol. 38v, 97r, asve.
21 For Shaykh ‘Ali al-Kilani, see Apellániz, Pouvoir et ªnance, 76; Ashtor, Levant Trade, 276.
For the exile of Arcangeli’s father, see Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Istoria Fiorentina (Flor-
ence, 1783), XII, 15.
22 For Brancacci’s report, see Brancacci, “Diario di Felice Brancacci, Ambasciatore con
Carlo Federighi al Cairo per il Comune di Firenze (1422),” Archivio Storico Italiano, VIII
(1881), 164. The identical expression can be found in Luca Molà and Mueller, “Essere
In line with this matter of convenience, Arcangeli appears to
have adopted a strategic ambivalence about his status, declaring to
Brancacci that he did not want to renounce either Florence or
Venice as a homeland (patria). But this duplicity could be trouble-
some, as it was during his later stay in Rhodes, where he had to
avoid being seen in public with Florentines. Poor investment deci-
sions seem to have driven Arcangeli out of the exclusive Venetian
business milieu of Egypt. Two patricians sued him at the end of
1419, sometime before he disappeared from the notarial docu-
ments. His career exempliªes the plight of the Mediterranean mer-
chant, forever dodging the legal authorities. When he ªnally sur-
faced in 1426 to close old debts, he was vaguely reported to be “of
Venice, inhabitant of Rhodes” but not a Venetian “cives,” as the
notary invariably called holders of full Venetian citizenship.23
Giorgio Londachi Unlike the three previous merchants, Gior-
gio Londachi was not a new citizen but an experienced trader,
ªnancier, and navigator from the Greek dominio, in close contact
with the Muslim administration. During the late 1410s, Londachi’s
business dealings were between Crete and Alexandria. He ex-
ported Greek wine to Egypt, fueling his trade through the credit
and navigational resources of his fellow Greeks. His personal net-
work for the years 1418 to 1420 was comprised almost exclusively
of Greeks, but it also had a few Jews of Candia and even Byzan-
tines. While in Alexandria, he served as a tax farmer for the Mam-
luk authorities. In contrast to Venetian citizens and patricians, the
most active Greeks and Jews in Candia at the time acted as lease-
holders of the Mamluk taxes on wine, courting Venetian exporters
while dealing with the Muslim authorities on a daily basis.24
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straniero a Venezia nel tardo Medioevo: accoglienza e riªuto nei privilegi di cittadinanza e
nelle sentenze criminali,” in Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica F. Datini (ed.), Le
migrazioni in Europa secc. XIII–XVIII: atti della “venticinquesima Settimana di studi” (Florence,
1994), 841. For a famous text on the Florentines in Tunis using the same expression, see
Giovanni Villani (ed. Giovanni Porta), Nuova Cronaca (Parma, 1991), 7, 53. The Italian ex-
pression—spacciarsi per—which can be found in several similar instances, clearly implies that,
voluntarily and by fraud, Arcangeli pretended to be a Venetian citizen.
23 B. 22, Notary V. Bonfantin: October 28, 1418, December 2, 1418, May 29, 1419, Sep-
tember 15, 1419, October 4, 29, 1419, November 16, 1419, January 1, 1420, February 12,
1420, March 12, 1420, October 28, 1419 (for the lawsuit); B. 211, Notary N. Turiano: fol. 5v,
April 23, 1427, fol. 18r, January 23, 1426, asve, ci, n.
24 B. 22, Notary V. Bonfantin: May 15, 1419, June 28, 1419, March 26, 1420, May 21,
1420, asve, ci, n; Cives database.
Working for the Mamluks: Intrigue, Religious Conversion, and Op-
portunism Together with Londachi, other Greek members of the
1418 to 1420 network worked for the Mamluk authorities. Nicola
Cumulo, Manoli Sclavo, and Johannes Jalina held the secondary
status of burgenses de Candia. The position of leaseholder for the
wine tax seems to have been reserved for non-Muslims, though
many documents suggest that the leaseholders were expected to
hold accounts and administrative records in Arabic. Although
Sclavo managed to survive in the troublesome Egyptian business
milieu for decades, his role as a Mamluk functionary brought him
into conºict with Venetian commercial agents. When, on one oc-
casion, he prohibited the entry of Venetian wine into Alexandria
because the shipment did not comply with Mamluk tax regula-
tions, the Venetian consul ªned him for “neither having any god
nor reverence for the Doge of Venice.”25
Although Greeks and Jews from Candia, like Sclavo, were not
allowed to beneªt from Venetian commercial institutions, their
role had a dynamic effect on business activity. Under al-Ashraf
Barsbay, Iohannes Jalina, another member of the Venetian net-
work, was sent to Rhodes pro servitio sultani. A patrician could
hardly have been expected to undertake such a risky and unre-
warding mission. The nobleman Angelo Michiel, a private mer-
chant and an informer for Venice in Cairo—a service that he per-
formed “for the country”—was the only patrician to report about
government ofªcials and Red Sea traders arriving in Egypt. Once,
when complaining to the Venetian consul about the dangerous and
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25 The notarial record explicitly mentions the appointment of Greeks as tax farmers or
Damin (latinized as damene) by the Muslim authorities and provides details about the ªnancial
agreements with the customs’ ofªcers (the qadi): B. 22, Notary V. Bonfantin: June 21, 1419,
asve, ci, n. Wine exports—including kosher wine—are well known for medieval Alexandria,
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499. For exports, see Ashtor, “New Data for the History of Levantine Jewries in the Fifteenth
Century,” Bulletin of the Institute of Jewish Studies, III (1975), 67–102. For a general survey of
Daman, or tax farming, see Encyclopaedia of Islam (Boston, 1979), I, 1144. B. 22, Crïsto del
Fïore, fol. 12v, December 14, 1425, asve, ci, n. Notary V. Bonfantin: November 2, 1418,
December 2, 1419, February 27, 1420, March 1, 12, 1420, May 21, 1420, July 17, 1420, asve,
ci, n; B215, Notary S. Peccator, fol. 8v, 9/27/1448, ASVe, Notarile Testamenti. Rossi,
Servodio Peccator, notaio, 37–38. Cives database.
expensive nature of his duties, he threatened thenceforth to mind
his own business and to send any news that he had by unprotected
mail if he was not paid in full for his intelligence activities. Presum-
ably, no lower-rank Venetian could have made such a demand.26
Andrea Cazilli played a crucial role in the 1418 to 1420 net-
work as an agent in Cairo, coordinating the Venetian galleys with
the arrival of Indian spices. In the Mamluk capital, he transmitted
information from Muslim merchants to the Venetian consul, and
he was an important diplomatic mediator, in close contact with
staff members of the sultan’s most important diwans. Through his
Arab contacts in Cairo, he sold African slaves to prominent mem-
bers of the patriciate. He also conducted trade in wine through
Crete and Venetian entrepôts further to the north. His vast per-
sonal network extended from Cairo to Alexandria and from
Damietta in the Nile delta to Crete and Venice.27
Emmanuel Piloti, who had a commercial and diplomatic
background similar to that of Cazilli, operated in Egypt for decades
with Arab, Sicilian, and Greek partners. He had contacts in Syria,
Cyprus, Salonika, and the Peloponnese. Piloti was one of the major
exporters of Cretan wine to Egypt. Though a protégé of the sultan
Faraj Ibn Barquq, he put his diplomatic skills at the disposal of the
Republic, acting as a Venetian mediator in a bilateral crisis. Piloti is
better known for the detailed proposal of a Crusade that he offered
to the Venetian pope Eugenius IV. Piloti took advantage of his
commercial expertise and knowledge of the region’s geography to
compose the text for it, in which the conquest of Alexandria played
a pivotal role.28
Jews in the Network As mentioned above, the extent to which
Jews could apply for Venetian citizenship is undecided. Historical
inquiry has focused on a few particular cases, mostly ad hoc privi-
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Dopp (Paris, 1958), xi, xviii–xxii. B. 222, Notary A. Vactaciis: October 20, 1404, Decem-
ber 15, 1405; B. 22, Notary V. Bonfantin: June 21, 28, 1419, asve, ci, n.
leges granted to single families or individuals. A notarial deed indi-
cates that Liaco Capsali, the most active Jewish merchant of the
1418 to 1420 network, attempted to obtain the legal rights of citi-
zenship. Contrary to claims based on his case that active Jewish en-
trepreneurs could apply for the citizenship of the colonies, accurate
analysis shows otherwise. Capsali probably sought the title of ªdelis,
a status inferior to that of Venetian citizenship.29
The careers of merchants ranked lower on the network scale
were often similar to those of the core members (though, as men-
tioned above, complementary information about lower-rated mer-
chants in the network is scarce). As a case in point, Grissono
d. Salomone, one of the few Jewish ship owners of the period, was
active in long-distance trade. Apparently of Sicilian origin, he set-
tled in Rethymnon in Crete, where he was active between 1411
and 1429. His career demonstrates that the legal status of Jews was
subject to negotiation to some extent. Unlike Capsali, who strug-
gled in court to win citizenship, Grissono tried to bypass restric-
tions by obtaining a special commercial dispensation. Although al-
ready connected to Alexandria via Cretan Jews in 1418, he did not
make an appearance in Egypt before 1424, when he acquired the
requisite privilege. The license extended his trading jurisdiction
from the periphery to the metropolis itself (tractere et expedire pro
veneto), the most controversial issue in the Venetian regulations.
Apparently, Jews’ involvement in long-distance trade was not out
of the question, but even when permitted, it did not necessarily
have favorable consequences. We know about Grissono’s privilege
only because it brought him trouble. As happened to many Jews of
the colonial dominio, he was accused of using his littera ducalis to
trade on behalf of non-Venetians.30
network evolution in the long run Network analysis can
uncover a set of contributors to a Venetian commercial network,
whereas a micro-approach stresses the social, cultural, and business
skills that these people exempliªed. Centrality analysis is inher-
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30 B. 245, Notaio Andrea Sebasto, October 26, 1411, asve, Notai di Candia; B. 1, data of
January 26, 1425, received (in Crete) March 26, 1426, fol.75v; data of August 25, 1424, re-
ceived (in Crete) October 15, 1424, fol. 67v–68r, asve, Duca di Candia. For Grissono’s activi-
ties, see Ashtor, “New Data,” 78–79.
ently circumscribed by the chronology of the notarial deeds, fall-
ing short of capturing long-term dynamics. However, it can be
useful, at least indirectly, for understanding such phenomena as
network transformation or disintegration. In that connection, fur-
ther investigation reveals that half of the lower-rank merchants, or
their descendants, studied in this article eventually abandoned the
Venetian network altogether, even though renunciation of obliga-
tions to Venice—even if only peripheral and not based on full
trading rights or citizenship—was a serious offense of which a few
instances are recorded.31
Cazilli crossed religious boundaries after more than ten years
of collaboration with the Venetians. Between 1425 and 1427, he
appears in the notary records as the Muslim Jamal al-Din. Yet, de-
spite his intriguing conversion to Islam, he lobbied to have his ex-
communication abrogated and to regain his Christian status.32
Londachi’s story makes clear that under Venetian regulations,
an individual’s ambitions and expectations might not come to fru-
ition. The careers of Malerbi and De Soris were cut short by plague
in Egypt, but Londachi moved to Rhodes in the 1430s to continue
his trade with Egypt. His desertion from Venice resulted in a com-
plex legal problem, especially after he set sail from Rhodes to
Damietta as a commander of a Genoese round ship, since the Ve-
netian senate explicitly forbade its subjects from working for other
principalities. Was Londachi still a Venetian? The Venetian consul
in Alexandria depicted Londachi as “a man of Rhodes” and a “re-
bel to the Venetian government.” When the Genoese consul tried
to intervene on Londachi’s behalf, the Mamluk authorities ob-
jected on the grounds that Londachi was for all intents and pur-
poses a Rhodian. Years later, at the height of his career as a busi-
nessman, Londachi acted again as a ªnancier in Rhodes, where he
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Immigrazione, 54
32 Cazilli’s conversion seems linked to the Mamluks’ decision in 1424 to punish the pi-
racy sponsored by the Cypriot government, in which he acted as a diplomatic broker and
ªnanced ransoms. See Mohamed Ouerfelli, “Les relations entre le royaume de Chypre et
le sultanat mamelouk au XVe siècle,” Le Moyen Age, CX (2004), 328, 338–340. B. 83II, No-
tary Cristoforo del Fiore, July 11, 1425, f. 8v–10v, in Cairo, asve, ci, n; B. 211, Notary
N. Turiano, October 16, 1427, f. 37v–38r, asve, ci, n.
was granted, of all things, the very citizenship that Venice routinely
denied to its Greek subjects.33
In this context, the move to rival hubs such as Rhodes in
search of better economic opportunities was another feature com-
mon to parvenu or second-class members of the network. Rhodes
acted as a trading post where spices could be imported and ex-
ported without the heavy Venetian duties and where Greeks could
become citizens and trade more freely. At least two of the net-
work’s stalwarts ªnished their careers in Rhodes, four if the focus is
on families rather than individuals. Originally from Bologna before
becoming naturalized Venetians, Andrea and Marco De Soris based
their activities in Alexandria during the mid-1420s, but they trans-
ferred the family enterprise afterward to Rhodes. They lived on the
island, where the family group seems to have inªltrated the Hos-
pitaller ruling class during the 1440s, while keeping their Venetian
citizenship.
As a major center for smuggling and piracy, as well as a com-
petitor to the Venetian galley trade, Rhodes was far removed from
the patrician center of operations. Establishing ofªces there proba-
bly implied a deªnitive shift from Venetian to Rhodian citizenship,
as seems to have been the case with Malerbi’s descendants. They
began to appear in the records as citizens of Rhodes during the
1470s. The different family generations embraced no fewer than
three political afªliations (Verona, Venice, and Rhodes) during a
100-year timespan.34
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“Cives venetos et mercatores in Roddo,” B. 211, Notary N. Turiano: March 27, 1427, f. 14v–
15v, asve, ci, n. Giacomo de Soris, prior of Hungary during the 1440s, was originally
commandeur of Bologna. See Pierre Boyssat, Histoire des Chevaliers de l’Ordre de l’Hospital de
S. Iean de Hierusalem (Lyon, 1611/12), I, 182. A “Johannes De Seris” (sic) appears as “consul
rhodianorum in alexandria” in B. 215, Notary S. Peccator: May 21, 1448, asve, Notarile
Testamenti. He is probably the same “Iohanni de Soris” quoted, as a relative of Benedetto, in
B. 22, Notary V, Bonfantin: June 25,1420, asve, ci, n. aom 382, f. 236r, 7/7/1475, aom 395,
f. 191v, July 16, 1504.
Arcangeli’s story also closed with an unexpected turn. His
Florentine tax declaration of 1427 indicates that thirty-ªve years af-
ter his father’s exile, and a few months after his last trip to Egypt, he
was allowed to return to Florence. Most likely, he liquidated his af-
fairs in the Levant and left Rhodes. Whatever motivations lay be-
hind this decision, he certainly made it in the context of serious
difªculties both in Egypt and in Venice.35
Contrary to implications, traditional micro-scale methodologies,
such as biographical analysis, do not necessarily clash with large-
scale observations of human behavior. The analysis of network
centrality highlights the activities of an otherwise neglected collec-
tion of people, stressing their relevance to the Venetian system of
business relations. Without it, we might never have known about
the signiªcance of these lower-rank Venetians. The examination of
social ties undertaken in this article shows that even when patri-
cians became dominant in a particular sector—in this case, the 1418
to 1420 commercial network—they had to rely on lower-class Ve-
netians to coordinate and complete transactions and to keep their
networks functioning.
A common behavioral pattern emerges from the biographies
of the lower-rank Venetians in the network before 1420. Against a
common background of legal constraints, they all had to conduct
themselves in a particular manner to join the network. They ma-
nipulated the legal deªnitions that Venice imposed upon them and
took advantage of the very categories that made them “foreigners”
and non-Venetians. Their language, their business acumen, and
their knowledge of the markets targeted by Venetian noblemen
enabled them to integrate into an otherwise-exclusive business
milieu.
The data also afford a look at the network’s evolution after
1420. Five personal and family stories show that the members of
the network continued to bargain for rights even after their situa-
tions had changed. The lower-rank Venetians who clustered at the
core of the 1418 to 1420 commercial network were by no means
averse to pursuing opportunities outside the Venetian orbit to im-
prove their stations and prospects. In fact, Venice’s ofªcial policies
of exclusion and inequality often encouraged lower-rank Vene-
tians to cross cultural and political boundaries.
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